A Structural Solution to Gerrymandering
Beyond Independent Redistricting Commissions
While Texas Republicans' latest move is undoubtedly an escalation, the truth is that technology is sufficiently advanced to the point where any system of single-member districts is democratically suboptimal. While it is in vogue to either support a state-by-state process of creating independent non-partisan redistricting commissions, or to have Congress ban partisan gerrymandering, each has problems that have been made painfully relevant in the last few months.
A state-by-state process, as has been pushed since the ratfucking that followed the 2010 census, is inherently vulnerable to defection. If every state adopted independent redistricting commissions, any single state would face enormous incentives to defect. The first state to abandon its commission could gerrymander strategically, leaving other states insufficient time to respond before the next election cycle. Meanwhile, a Federal independent commission would be inherently vulnerable to the type of court-enabled unitary-executive behavior we have seen from this administration.
While many well-meaning people think that enlarging the house could be a good solution, I see two notable problems: one from precedent, the other from practice. In terms of precedent, the Pennsylvania state legislature, with more than 200 members seems a good case study. After winning it in 2010, Republicans were able to redistrict such that they maintained an almost 10 percent majority in 2012, even as President Obama won the state by more than 5 percentage points. For the practical problem, I would ask you to use any LLM to help you with a pretend redistricting problem and see how easy it is to draw lines to meet pretty much any goal. If you want data, the Times posted a good source here.
My solution is fairly simple: amending the Uniform Congressional District Act of 1967 to require each state elect their representatives through a single multi-member district, chosen through a party-list, rather than first past the post single member districts. How that would work is as follows: each party looking to contest the election in a state would create a list of candidates the same length as the number of representatives for the state. Then, the voting public would vote for a party, rather than an individual candidate. The seats would be divided according to the party split, with candidates at the top of the list being selected first.
This method is practically immune from gerrymandering, but it does raise two problems: constituent service, and party power. The constituent service problem, I think is easily manageable, as I would imagine the state parties would compete over who could offer better constituent services, as it would be a major hedge against national political winds. Furthermore, as the population per district has almost tripled over the last century, a further increase in the number of constituents would not be extreme. Especially because Senators already provide those services to the area of the whole state.
As to the issue of party power, I see it as a benefit. While it is not the point of this post, I see the weakness of American parties as a major contributor to the Democratic backsliding we have seen in the last few decades. While it is unlikely that parties would willingly accommodate insurgent movements, they would have to deal with the treat of a movement forming a third party in the state to compete, and therefore have to either adapt to their populations or see their power collapse. That would also, in my opinion, limit the power of entrenched incumbents. While parties would almost certainly put their most powerful members at or near the top of their state lists, unpopular incumbents would be a much larger drag in this system than in the current one.